This is a secret document leaked by WikiLeaks and covers various threats and strategic assessments from Israeli Director of Military Intelligence, MG Amos Yadlin in 2007.
- MG Amos Yadlin's Threat Hierarchy: During a meeting with the Ambassador, Israeli Director of Military Intelligence (IDI) MG Amos Yadlin stated that Gaza ranked as the fourth major threat for Israel, following Iran, Syria, and Hizballah. He believed an armed confrontation between Hamas and Fatah in Gaza had been anticipated since Hamas won the 2006 legislative council elections. He argued that Hamas initiated the recent escalation, albeit without a premeditated political decision to eliminate Fatah in Gaza. He also dismissed concerns about an Iranian presence in Gaza. Regarding predictions of war with Syria, Yadlin suggested the region was on high alert, and conflict could arise even if neither side sought it. He believed the Asad regime might not survive a war but noted Israel's waning concern about its fate.
- Gaza Not Israel's Primary Concern: Yadlin placed Gaza as the fourth most significant threat to Israel and considered it "hopeless" at the moment. He argued that Hamas provided no solution to the Palestinian situation and highlighted the lack of control by leaders like Abbas and Haniyeh over armed factions in Gaza.
- Complex Factions in Gaza: Yadlin pointed out the complexity of factions within both Fatah and Hamas, as well as multiple armed groups not aligned with either party. He discussed the Qassam rocket attacks on Sderot and their reduction in response to IDF retaliation.
- No Premeditated Effort to Wipe Out Fatah: According to Yadlin, the day's attacks by Hamas on Fatah security forces were likely not part of a premeditated plan to eliminate Fatah in Gaza. They may have resulted from the initiative of the Hamas military wing with the tacit consent of Khalid Mishal in Damascus.
Gaza and West Bank Separation: Yadlin expressed doubts about Fatah's willingness to fight in Gaza, believing that the balance of power favored Hamas. However, he noted Fatah's relatively stronger position in the West Bank and indicated that Tawfiq Tirawi had influence there. He suggested that Israel would welcome a separate Fatah regime in the West Bank, enabling the IDF to treat Gaza as a hostile state.
Concerns About an Iranian Opening in Gaza: Yadlin did not think that Gaza having an Iranian presence would be a significant concern for Israel unless it had a port, sea, or air.
War with Syria: Yadlin discussed speculations about a potential war with Syria, comparing it to events leading up to the 1967 war. He mentioned Syria's heightened state of alert and self-confidence. A war could occur easily despite neither side actively seeking it. He believed that the Asad regime might not survive a war, but Israel was no longer concerned about its preservation.
Positive Impact of Nahr al-Barid Fighting: The Ambassador inquired about the fighting in the Nahr al-Barid refugee camp in Lebanon. Yadlin indicated that the situation was positive for Israel as it had embarrassed Hizballah and led to strengthening the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) while undermining the Fatah al-Islam terrorist organization.
- Comment on Yadlin's Attitude: Yadlin's view on the Gaza situation represents a shift in IDF thinking from the previous year, with less concern about Gaza and a focus on more substantial threats from the north.
Hamas is considered a terrorist organization by multiple countries and organizations, including Israel, the United States, the European Union, and others, but somehow were encouraged to takeover the Gaza Strip by Israeli Director of Military Intelligence, MG Amos Yadlin and US Ambassador Richard Jones
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